Introduction
It is increasingly common in the United States for citizens, legislators and public officials to appeal to particular religious beliefs both as justifications for laws or public policy and as grounding exemptions from generally applicable laws. For example, recently, the Indiana Legislature passed and the Governor signed a bill that permits business owners to refuse service to gays and lesbians in the name of "religious freedom." Religious Freedom and Restoration Acts, as they are frequently called, state their aim as preventing governments from "substantially burdening" person's free exercise of religion, including "any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 2 Such acts potentially allow for broad and sweeping religious exemptions from generally applicable laws, including civil rights laws that aim to protect persons from discrimination on the basis of group-membership.
Although a variety of justifications are offered for such "Religious Restoration
Acts," one prominent justification within liberal political discourse rests on the claim that religiously grounded exemptions from some laws are necessary to preserve the integrity The belief of the Hahns and Greens implicates a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is immoral for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another. It is not for the Court to say that the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs are mistaken or unreasonable.
[…] The Court's "narrow function . . . is to determine" whether the plaintiffs' asserted religious belief reflects "an honest conviction," and there is no dispute here that it does.
3
Although the Court doesn't use the language of "integrity," it raises the concern that compelling, through legislation, persons of faith to engage in acts that they view as complicitous with acts regarded as immoral from the point of view of their religious doctrines is an unacceptable burden for religious persons to bear.
Indeed, a similar objection has been pressed against political liberalism, in which concerns about integrity are made explicit. The "integrity objection," as we will call it, takes slightly different form when pressed against political liberalism, for the primary concern there is whether through its account of public justification, political liberalism unduly burdens religious persons' ability to engage in public reason. Our concern in this paper is to examine the integrity objection in detail and to argue that it fails to present a serious challenge to political liberalism's account of public reason. We claim that just as the idea of public reason applies to certain principles and laws and requires that such laws be justifiable on the basis of public reason, so, too, must religious exemptions be justifiable on the basis of public reason.
Political Liberalism and Public Reason
Before we address the integrity objection in its various formulations, we sketch the contours of our view, defended elsewhere, in a bit more detail. Political liberals aim to explain the possibility of just and stable liberal democratic society given the fact of reasonable pluralism (PL, 4) . Persons as citizens are viewed as engaged in a cooperative enterprise and seek to create and maintain a liberal democratic state based on mutual respect. For a state to be just and stable, the coercive power of the state must be legitimate. According to Rawls, " [o] ur exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions -were we to state them as government officials -are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons." 4 Satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy requires that political liberals adopt a particular account of public reason. Rawls says this idea of public reason "arises from a conception of democratic citizenship in a constitutional democracy" and that it is "a relation of free and citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body" (IPRR, 577).
The view of public reason that we defend for political liberals, which we call -the exclusive idea of public reason -has several components, although we will only stress some of those for our discussion here. First, with other political liberals 5 , we endorse a criterion of shareability for the public justification of certain principles and laws. (PL, (12) (13) (14) .
Hence, legislators, judges and public officials in their official capacities are bound to limit their consideration of principles and laws and of the reasons that support them to ones that are sharable by persons understood as free and equal citizens. Citizens, too, when engaging in public political debate and when voting, have a moral duty of civility to reason in this way. As it is sometimes expressed, we endorse a principle of exclusion for public justification, 7 which limits the reasons that can publicly justify certain principles and laws to those that can be shared by persons as free and equal citizens.
Furthermore, we endorse a principle of restraint for public deliberation, in which persons as citizens or as public officials, are morally bound to refrain from appealing to principles or reasons that cannot be shared by persons as free and equal citizens. Insofar as any persons fail to live up to this moral duty, they are thereby appropriately subject to moral criticism.
Second, we take the criterion of justification to follow from the fact that political liberals take the basis of the authority of political principles to come from the fact of agreement that certain principles are suitable to govern us as free and equal persons who 7 We adopt Kevin Vallier's terminology for public reason of "principle of exclusion" and "principle of restraint. Below we will call our view an exclusive idea of public reason. This marks our commitment to the view that the only reasons that can justify relevant principles or laws in public reason are those that can be shared among persons as free and equal citizens.
Values and beliefs that can't be shared by persons as free and equal citizens are excluded as justifications for laws or as reasons for an exemption from a law, and both persons as citizens and public officials should refrain from appealing to their worldviews as justifications for laws or exemptions in public deliberation. The latter, again, reflects our endorsement of a principle of restraint.
Alienation and Integrity 9
Some critics of political liberalism's account of public reason argue that any principle of restraint as such unduly burdens religious citizens in their participation in 9 In this paper we put aside one peculiar type of integrity challenge to political liberalism. Micah Schwartzman considers the possibility that the demands of public reason pressure citizens to be insincere in public deliberation. To begin, we will show that the alienation objection and the integrity objection are grounded in similar concerns, namely, the terms of participation of people of faith in a politically liberal state, but these objections are not the same. Alienation involves estrangement or detachment. To be alien is literally to be foreign. The focus of the alienation objection is that believers, as a paradigmatic example, can only participate in public, political discourse if they detach or estrange themselves from their fundamental values and beliefs and limit their discourse to public reasons. In other words, the focus of this objection is that citizens of faith (or all citizens) will have to distance themselves from their faith (or, their worldview) to comply with the demands of public reason. This distancing is a kind of problematic alienation, as the demands of public reason preclude persons from justifying laws or exemptions from laws on the basis of the whole truth as they see it. It is thought that the required restraint of public reason induces a kind of psychic strain in persons in which they must treat their most deeply held convictions as "foreign" in some way in order to participate in public reason.
This objection goes to the heart of political liberalism, for if it is successful either 1) it means that a commitment to public reason cannot be adequately grounded in some or all reasonable persons' reasonable comprehensive doctrines (what Rawls calls "full justification" is not possible 12 ) and, thus, will result in estrangement or 2) it means that such an embedding of the political conception of justice within some or all reasonable persons' reasonable comprehensive doctrines will involve a kind of psychic strain to the point of inducing feelings of estrangement. Note, though, that even if there is alienation or psychic strain, its mere presence may not be unacceptable. Those who wish to push this line of criticism must show that alienation or such psychic strain is unjustifiable. To the extent that the argument focuses on such psychic strain, the suggestion seems to be that non-believers don't have similar burdens and so there is a fundamental unfairness at stake. Believers are asked to carry a burden non-believers are not, so a principle of restraint "unduly" or "substantially" burdens believers.
We might understand the worry that psychic strain can result from trying to reconcile a political conception of justice with one's comprehensive doctrine as the worry that attempting such reconciliation may, in fact, preclude what Frankfurt calls "wholeheartedness." Indeed, consider the quote at the beginning of this chapter in which Rawls asks how persons of faith can be wholehearted members of a liberal democratic society. Wholeheartedness, for Frankfurt, includes, inter alia, the elimination for agents of "inconsistent second-order desires" and of ambivalence with respect to whether "to identify with a particular desire"; wholeheartedness requires a unified self. 13 Framed in terms of whole-heartedness, the concern can be expressed as follows: insofar as believers face greater obstacles to achieving a "unified self" under the demands of a principle of restraint, such a principle unduly burdens believers and, again, as such is unfair.
depending upon what the doctrine allows. Some may consider the political conception of justice even though it is not accepted by other people. Whether our view is endorsed by them is not given sufficient weight to suspect its full justification in our own eyes." He goes on to say, and this is important: "Thus it is left to each citizen, individually or in association with others, to say how the claims of political justice are to be ordered, or weighed, against nonpolitical values. The political conception gives no guidance in such questions, since it does not say how nonpolitical values are to be counted." PL, 386-387. Those concerned with integrity and not simply alienation may also focus on wholeheartedness, too. Wholeheartedness is central to one of three dominant conceptions of integrity that Cheshire Calhoun helpfully distinguishes in her work; indeed, we take her to have identified the important conceptions of integrity for our purpose of analyzing concerns about integrity and public reason. Calhoun says that wholeheartedness as related to integrity means "integrating competing desires into a single ordering as well as separating some desires from the self and regulating them to 'outlaw' status." 14 Recall that inconsistency of desires and ambivalence spoil wholeheartedness on this view. An individual who is of "two minds" doesn't have integrity. 15 Calhoun calls this the integrated-self view of integrity. Here we might understand the integrity objection as the worry that the demands of public reason create circumstances which lead to persons of faith being placed in a position of having "two minds": on the one hand, they may want to honor the terms of public reason and, on the other hand, they may want to appeal to their worldviews to ground laws and as the basis for exemptions. Insofar as integrity demands "self-integration" and the norms of public reason prevent individuals from appealing to their worldviews, public reason's principle of restraint could be thought to violate the integrity of persons of faith.
Putting aside whether consistency with respect to one's desires and nonambivalence really are central to integrity 16 , does the integrity objection based on this conception of integrity pose a challenge for an exclusive idea of public reason? We think it doesn't. The notion of integrity upon which it is based can't exclude those persons who endorse the oppression and intolerance of others from making similar integrity based acceptable. 18 Therefore, the kind of integrity concerns that animate the integrity objection cannot be adequately grounded in such an integrated-self conception of integrity.
Consider another conception of integrity, which Calhoun calls the identity view and locates in the work of Bernard Williams. On this view, integrity is a matter of "fidelity to those projects and principles which are constitutive of one's core identity."
19 This is distinguishable from the integrated-self view insofar at it hones in on constitutive commitments, rather than all commitments. Central to this view is an idea of character that consists of a person's foundational commitments and projects that give meaning and value to her life; a person with integrity lives in accordance with the commitments that she takes to define who she is. Integrity, so understood, entails that an agent acts in concert with her most deeply held convictions. To the extent that any agent fails to maintain fidelity to her foundational commitments, she lacks integrity in that respect.
Expressed as a concern over the integrity of believers in a politically liberal state with a norm of restraint, the claim would be that failing to express one's foundational commitments in public reason undermines one's integrity to the extent that it blocks agents from publicly expressing fidelity to their foundational commitments. foundational commitments, it may be claimed that the idea of public reason substantially burdens some persons' integrity.
Importantly, both the integrated-self view of integrity and the identity view of integrity are formal in the sense that there are no substantive constraints on the content of either the desires or the commitments and projects one has relative to assessing integrity.
On either account, both a human rights activist working to help all people have basic rights and a mobster who kills his wife when he learns she is secretly a loyal member of another group may be viewed as having integrity, provided these actions either reflect Hence, any rendering of the integrity objection must be sensitive to the fact that some persons' objections to the demands of public reason are unwarranted, and their framing of such concerns in terms of integrity does not in and of itself imply that accommodation is necessary. Political liberals, specifically, should reject a formal account of integrity insofar as it potentially raises integrity concerns for the unreasonable and the intolerant, given the assurance that others will likewise do so" (PL, 49). Second, he claims that reasonable persons have a "willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime" (PL, 54). To restate the integrity objection, one might claim that the demands of public reason infringe upon the integrity of reasonable persons of faith and prevent their participation in public, political debate as equals. We still need a notion of integrity to ground these concerns. We will return to the cleans-hands picture to see if it fares any better when this qualification is added.
If principles or laws (e.g., legal abortion) that can be publicly justified given the exclusive view of public reason conflict with the moral tenets of a reasonable person's faith or conflict with how she understands her faith to best be practiced, then it might be argued that the exclusive view of public reason precludes reasonable persons from purity of agency or "forces" them to cooperate with evil. What is worse, perhaps, is that insofar as laws are viewed as collectively willed (and that is the grounds of their authority, too) the law is in their name. To maintain integrity, it might be argued that reasonable persons of faith must take a stand and assert their fundamental principles in public deliberation; however, by taking a stand with respect to their so-called "bottom-line principles," reasonable persons of faith would violate the demands of public reason.
Persons of faith, then, can either maintain integrity or respect the demands of public reason, but not both.
This way of stating the objection is a bit misguided. Importantly, political liberalism's idea of public reason starts with the idea that "insistence on the whole truth in politics" is "incompatible with democratic citizenship and the idea of legitimate law"
(IPRR, 579). Reasonable persons think that principles of basic justice and constitutional essentials must be ones that reasonable persons viewed as free and equal citizens can accept as reasonable. Furthermore, agreeing to respect the outcome of public reason does not mean that one thinks the results of public reason reflect the truth in any sense but, again, only that from the point of the view of a free and equal citizen, the outcome is reasonable to accept. In other words, the outcome is justified from the political point of view. Consider Rawls's discussion about disagreement over the legal right to abortion:
Some may, of course, reject a decision, as Catholics may reject a decision to grant a right to abortion. They may present an argument in public reason for denying it and fail to win a majority. But they need not exercise the right of abortion in their own case. They can recognize the right as belonging to legitimate law and therefore do not resist it with force. To do that would be unreasonable; it would mean their attempting to impose their own comprehensive doctrine, which a majority of other citizens who follow public reason do not accept (PL, liv-lv).
Hence, reasonable persons of faith can't reasonably be thought of as being made to do, or collaborating with, evil. They accept a certain procedure and norms for the determination of legitimate law and the outcome of this procedure is regarded as reasonable to accept from the point of view of a person as a free and equal citizen. Insisting on the whole truth as one sees it from within one's comprehensive doctrine as the basis for coercive laws that govern others who reasonably reject such comprehensive values is to simply reject the foundational assumptions of political liberalism, and perhaps, public reason liberalism altogether. If one accepts the fact of reasonable pluralism and yet desires to find terms of social cooperation that are reasonably acceptable to those whom are subject to them, then one is at least committed to the claim that insisting upon one's own comprehensive doctrines as the basis for legitimate law for all persons, even those that reject such doctrines, is simply unreasonable. With regard to the controversial issue of abortion, it is important to remember that persons of faith need not regard abortions as morally permissible. Rather, they must simply recognize the right as a matter of legitimate law.
But, perhaps, when the issue is a religious exemption from a generally applicable law as opposed to justification for a law, concerns about the integrity of persons of faith will fare better. There may seem to be a difference between wanting to use one's worldview to ground a law for everyone when one knows that reasonable people disagree about how the world is and what is of value and wanting to use one's worldview to justify an exemption from a generally applicable law that one takes to burden one's practice of one's faith. We will address this in more detail below. Still, though, we need something other than the merely formal accounts of integrity we have considered thus far, for we need some way of distinguishing between reasonable claims for exemption and unreasonable ones, and a formal account of integrity can't do that work.
Calhoun claims that on each of the views of integrity we have discussed -the integrated-self view, the identity view and the cleans-hands view, integrity is understood as a personal virtue, and she claims that integrity is, in fact, a social virtue.
Understanding integrity as a social virtue may allow us to get more purchase from integrity worries about the idea of public reason. According to Calhoun, personal virtues involve "having the proper relation to oneself" whereas social virtues involve "having the Our main response to this formulation of the integrity objection when it comes justifying generally applicable laws on the basis of one's worldview has to do with the important difference between standing for what one fundamentally endorses before others (as one might do by penning an editorial, joining social activist group, or organizing a protest) and claiming what one stands for can justify the coercion of those others when one understands oneself to be engaged in a cooperative project with them, when one understands the authority of laws to stem from their ability to be collectively willed and when one acknowledges reasonable disagreement among reasonable persons.
Advocating for political principles, policies, or legislation isn't simply about sharing with fellow co-deliberators what one thinks matters or is of value. Political power, as Rawls says, is always coercive. Justifications must be addressed to others as engaged in a particular kind of project.
To give the integrity objection force, one would have to argue that the conditions of the use of public reason generate an unfair distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation to some subset of reasonable citizens, and we address this below.
Otherwise either persons of faith (or others strongly committed to the strength of their comprehensive values) are committed to finding fair terms of cooperation for persons viewed as free and equal citizens or they are not. If they are not interested in finding fair terms of cooperation, so described, then the political liberal has nothing to say to them.
Political liberals do not aim to convince skeptics of liberalism, in whatever form, to embrace liberal ideals. Rather, political liberals ask: given the fact of reason pluralism, is a just and stable society among persons viewed as free and equal citizens possible?
Respecting the integrity of reasonable persons can't mean that the outcomes of public, political deliberation will track or even be consistent with a person's deliberative judgments about what matters independent of how considering how coercion can be legitimate. So, too, respecting the integrity of reasonable persons does not mean that norms for public, political deliberation must be such that persons can appeal to their
deliberative judgment about what matters if there are good reasons for restricting such appeals, and political liberals think that there are.
Having argued that integrity based concerns fail to ground claims to general laws based on religiously grounded values, we now consider integrity based claims for religiously based exemptions from generally applicable laws. While one might think that this case is fundamentally different from the case of justifying generally applicable laws insofar as persons of faith are asking for an accommodation from a generally applicable law, it is not. Accommodations or exemptions from a law are simply part of a law properly understood. And, even if one doesn't accept that, accommodations or exemptions are law and backed by the state's coercive power. Political liberals think that for the state's coercive power to be legitimate certain principles and laws must ones that can be shared by persons as free and equal citizens. And, here, again, political liberals think that there is a difference between standing for something in public deliberation where the state's coercive power is not at stake and when it is. If a matter is one to which public reason applies, then the norms of public reason hold, even if persons seek an exemption from a law as stated. This does not mean that political liberals can't recognize religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Rather, it means that religious exemptions must be sought, ultimately, on the basis of public political values, that is, they must stem from considerations that are part of a reasonable political conception of justice. In each of these cases, arguments for or against an exemption can be made in terms of -and indeed were made in terms of at least to some extent -public reasons. In many of these cases the reasons concerned equal citizenship. Hence, where the idea of public reason applies, persons of faith and nonbelievers can make claims about proposed laws and principles and exemptions on the basis of the equality of their freedom of conscience relative to other citizens. Importantly, though, freedom of conscience understood through the lens of equality is inclusive of the views that persons may have that are religious in nature and those that are not. Framed as an integrity based claim for an exemption on the "standing for something" account of integrity, one would appeal to one's equal standing in a community of others. Rawls acknowledges the centrality of such "integrity" when he underscores that central to citizenship is that persons see themselves as "self-authenticating sources of valid claims" (PL, 32). So we propose that claims for an exemption based on freedom of conscious or the free exercise of religion are best understood as claims of justice grounded in the value of equal citizenship.
Hence claims that generally applicable laws undermine one's ability to act on one's freedom of conscience are ultimately best understood as claims that one's equality relative to other citizens is undermined. And, political liberals can certainly recognize such claims. However, such equality-based claims cannot ground the right to exemption from generally applicable laws that aim to secure the equal civil rights of others. Aiming to argue that they should, via integrity, both misunderstands the structure of the public reason argument that can ground such exemptions and, in effect, argues that freedom of conscience understood as integrity should outweigh the equal standing of others as citizens. Political liberals must reject this kind of argument.
Integrity and Realizing Citizenship
Paul Weithman advances a different version of the integrity objection, and we would be remiss not to address it here. He claims that an account of public reason that excludes reasons grounded in religious beliefs from the justificatory domain and that restrains person from offering such reasons as justifications in public reason will unduly burden believers in the "realization of citizenship. all citizens, including those within whom one has reasonable disagreement.
Stability
The concerns that animate the various versions of the integrity objection raise questions that threaten to show that political liberalism is not possible. Political liberals, again, are concerned with the possibility of a just and stable liberal democratic state, where stability is not a mere modus vivendi but "stability for the right reasons." It must be the case that some reasonable political conception of justice can structure the main institutions of society viewed as a system and such a reasonable political conception of justice can have the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. A central condition for such stability is that citizens will come to judge that political values "normally outweigh" their comprehensive values, should the two come into conflict (157). Even more, stability requires that citizens endorse the political conception of justice for moral reasons, not merely as a strategic arrangement or the best they can do under the circumstances. This is "stability for the right reasons." Thinking of concerns about integrity in terms of stability leads to important questions: 1) Are the defenders of the integrity objection denying that a basic structure organized in accordance with a reasonable political conception of justice could help to engender the moral motivation (a sense of justice) needed so that believers will "normally" judge that (PL, 145) . In each case, he aims to establish that the fundamental ideas ("society as a fair system of cooperation and of citizens as reasonable and rational, free and equal") can find support, and be endorsed, as a part of those doctrines. These illustrations are useful; however, the key to the argument lies in the claim that any reasonable comprehensive doctrine must come to recognize that cooperation with others on fair terms is only possible under a reasonable constitutional democracy. In addressing the question, Rawls writes:
How is it possible-or is it-for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline? Here the answer lies in the religious or nonreligious doctrine's understanding and accepting that, except by endorsing a reasonable constitutional democracy, there is no other way fairly to ensure the liberty of its adherents consistent with the equal liberties of other reasonable free and equal citizens.
Philosophers, aiming to establish the plausibility of political liberalism, can make arguments from conjecture as to how some reasonable comprehensive doctrine can support a political conception of justice. Rawls engages in such "reasoning from conjecture" in aiming to show how various comprehensive doctrines can support a political conception of justice and become part of a reasonable overlapping consensus.
Moreover, he thinks such reasoning from conjecture has an important role to play within political society, among citizens. "In this case we reason from what we believe, or conjecture, may be other people's basic doctrines, religious or philosophical, and seek to show them that despite what they may think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception of justice" (IPRR, 591). Beyond such illustrations and arguments from conjecture, we cannot know in advance whether a reasonable overlapping consensus will emerge. At this point, the best we can do is offer arguments that it is a plausible hope, a realistic hope. Part of establishing that such a hope is reasonable, and not delusional, of course, is showing that the demands of justice and the use of public reason are not too much, too much psychic strain or too much of a burden or, even, an unfair burden. This is what the integrity objection, in some of its versions, denies.
